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THE PRESIDENT AS SCIENTIST -IN-CHIEF
MICHELE ESTRIN GILMAN·

On February 18, 2004, a group of sixty scientists, including 20
Nobel Laureates, issued a joint statement condemning the
administration of President George W. Bush for distorting scientific
knowledge to achieve political ends. I The Union of Concerned
Scientists (UCS) alleged, for instance, that the White House had
forced the EPA to downplay the human causes of climate change in a
major report and suppressed another EPA study endorsing the Senate
version of a clean air bill over the Administration version. 2 More
broadly, the UCS asserted that the White House was removing
respected scientists from advisory boards and replacing them with
unqualified industry insiders, giving non-scientists free reign to
overrule scientific findings, and censoring scientific conclusions that
ran counter to Administration policy preferences. 3 Reflecting on
President Bush's predecessors, the UCS stated that other
Administrations have, on occasion, engaged in such practices, but not
so systemically nor on so wide a front. 4 In short, the UCS statement
and accompanying report described a President acting as a Scientistin-Chief.

'" Associate Professor and Director, Civil Advocacy Clinic, University of Baltimore
School of Law. J.D., 1993, University of Michigan Law School. B.A., 1990, Duke University.
\. See UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (UCS), SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY IN POLlCY
MAKING: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S MISUSE OF SCIENCE
(2004), available by request to rsi@ucsusa.org, updated version available at
http://www .ucsusa. org/assets/documents/sc ienti fic _inte gri ty/ scienti fic _integrity_in_po licy_
makingjuly_2004_1.pdf.
2. !d. at 5, 9.
3. Id. at 19-25.
4. !d. at 26.
No administration has been above inserting politics into science from time to time.
However a considerable number of individuals who have served in positions
directly involved in the federal government's use of scientific knowledge and
expertise have asserted that the Bush administration is, to an unprecedented degree,
distorting and manipulating the science meant to assist the formation and
implementation of policy.

!d.
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Similar protests arose within government ranks as well. Federal
agency scientists alleged that they were subject to political litmus
tests as a condition of being hired. s The media reported about
scientists who claimed they were censored, forced to alter their
conclusions, and prohibited from issuing reports and attending
conferences. 6 Government scientists leaked studies to the press that
the Bush Administration allegedly suppressed. 7 A 2006 survey of
climate scientists in seven federal agencies showed that 43% of
respondents reported that they or their colleagues faced personal
pressure from the Bush Administration to change scientific findings. 8
Surveys of other agencies likewise found political interference. At
FDA, 18% of respondents stated that they had been asked to change
their scientific conclusions for non-scientific reasons. 9 At the Fish
and Wildlife Service, 44% of respondents who worked on endangered
species issues reported that they "have been directed, for nonscientific reasons, to refrain from making . . . findings that are'
protective of species."lo Several career scientists and agency officials
quit their jobs to protest White House influence over agency
decisions. II
5. Andrew C. Revkin, Bush v. the Laureates: How Science Became a Partisan Issue,
N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 19,2004.
6. See Daniel Howden, US Censors Arctic Scientists' Findings as It Prepares for Oil
and Gas Auction, THE INDEPENDENT, Jan. 22, 2008; Juliet Eilperin, Climate Researchers
Feeling Heatfrom the White House, WASH. POST, Apr. 6,2006, at A27; Andrew C. Revkin &
Matthew L. Wald, Material Shows Weakening of Climate Change Reports, N.Y. TiMES, Mar.
20, 2007, at A16; Christopher Lee, Ex-Surgeon General Says White House Shushed Him,
WASH. POST, July 11,2007, at AI; Juliet Eilperin, Censorship Is Alleged at NOAA: Scientists
Afraid to Speak Out, NASA Climate Expert Reports, WASH. POST, Feb. II, 2006, at A07;
Andrew C. Revkin, Climate Expert Says NASA Tried to Silence Him, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29,
2006; Paul Recer, Scientists Feel Stifled by Bush Administration, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 2005,
atA2.
7. See Andrew C. Revkin. Climate Research Faulted over Missing Components, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 22, 2005.
8. UCS, Survey: Federal Climate Scientists (2006), http://www.ucsusa.org/scientific_
integrity/abuses_oCscience/federal-climate-scientists.htm!.
9. UCS, VOICES OF SCIENTISTS AT FDA: PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH DEPENDS ON
INDEPENDENT SCIENCE (2006), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/
scientific_integrity/fda-survey-brochure.pdf.
10. UCS, Survey: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Scientists (2005), http://www.ucsusa
.org!scientific_integrity/abuses_oCscience/investigations_and_surveys/us-fish-wildlifeservice.htm!.
II. See, e.g., Rob Stein, Internal Dissension Grows as CDC Faces Big Threats to Public
Health, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2005 at A9; Kenneth Chang, Scientists Say They Were
Questioned on Politics, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2004; Gardiner Harris, Official Quits on Pill
Delay at the F.D.A., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1,2005.
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Although the Bush Administration disputed these allegations, I 2
you do not need a PhD in science--or even a law degree-to
recognize that the Scientist-in-Chief model is entirely consistent with
the unitary executive theory that the White House aggressively
employed throughout the Bush presidency. Under unitary executive
theory, the President is at the apex of the executive branch and all
executive officers serve in his stead. 13 Thus, the President can direct
agencies in exercising their delegated powers. 14 Scholars have
extensively debated the merits of unitary executive theory in the
context of the national security and foreign affairs issues implicated
by President Bush's War on Terror. ls Yet the unitary executive
debate paid less attention to the Bush Administration's approach to
domestic policy, where President Bush also enforced a vigorous view
of the unitary executive. 16 This neglect is unwarranted. Federal
agencies make scientific and technical decisions that touch each and
every American in all areas of life, ranging from air quality to food
safety to disease transmission.
Of course, it is not surprising that President Bush moved federal
policy in directions favorable to important constituencies that helped
him get elected. Environmental policies shifted towards the interests
of oil, gas and coal companies, as well as ranchers, timber companies,
and other big businesses. I? Pollution controls were eased, endangered
species lost habitats, and public health dangers were minimized. 18
Scientific findings also lost out to the interests of religious
conservatives when the FDA denied approval of the non-prescription
Plan B contraceptive pill and when the National Cancer Institute

12. See Andrew C. Revkin, Bush's Science Aide Rejects Claims ofDistorted Facts, N.Y.
TIMES, April 3, 2004.
13. See Christopher S. Yoo, Stephen G. Calabresi & Anthony J. Colangelo, The Unitary
Executive in the Modern Era, 1945-2004,90 IOWA L. REv. 601, 607 (2005).
14. See Robert D. Sloane, The Scope of Executive Power In the Twenty-First Century:
An Introduction, 88 B. U. L. REv. 341,343--47 (2008).
15. See, e.g., Dawn E. Johnsen, What's a President to Do? Interpreting the Constitution
in the Wake of Bush Administration Abuses, 88 B. U. L. Rev. 395 (2008); JACK L.
GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY:
LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION (2007).
16. See generally Y 00, Calabresi, & Colangelo, supra note 13.
17. See Patrick Parenteau, Anything Industry Wants: Environmental Policy Under Bush
1I, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'y F. 363, 363 (2004).
18. See id. at 363 (listing ways in which the Bush Administration "has set about the task
of systematically and unilaterally dismantling over thirty years of environmental and natural
resources law").
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issued a fact sheet falsely suggesting a link between abortion and
breast cancer. 19
Unitary executive theory suggests that voters have gotten what
they bargained for and that if they did not like these federal policies,
they would punish the President through the electoral process. 20 This
supposition gets to the heart of the debate over the President's
directory authority; that is, whether the President can direct federal
agencies in exercising their delegated powers. As Professor Peter
Strauss has put it, the question is whether the President should be an
overseer or a decider. 21 When politics, law, and science collide, this
question is further complicated because these disciplines differ widely
in approach, assumptions, and aims.
Science is only one
consideration in these controversial policy decisions implicating
moral, ethical, and economic factors.
This article explores President Bush's actions as Scientist-inChief, a role in which he took political control over the scientific
decisions of federal agencies. Part I describes two high profile
examples in which President Bush allegedly distorted scientific data
to achieve his own policy objectives: first, the government's failure to
acknowledge and regulate the human causes of climate change and
second, the President's decision to ban federally funded research
involving human embryonic stem cells other than those lines already
in existence as of the date of his decision. Part II explores the
legitimacy of the Scientist-in-Chief. This Part explores whether the
President has explicit or implicit statutory authority to make scientific
decisions, and concludes that at least with regard to global warming
and stem cells, no such authority exists. Rather, President Bush
asserted a broad directory authority over federal agencies.

19. CHRIS MOONEY, THE REpUBLICAN WAR ON SCIENCE, 170-235 (2005)
(documenting ways in which the views of religious conservatives have impacted federal
agency policies related to evolution and sexuality). In addition, the President has argued
without empirical evidence that faith-based social services are superior to secular services, and
he has vastly expanded government funding of faith-based social services without legislative
authority. See Michele Gilman, If at First You Don't Succeed, Sign an Executive Order:
President Bush and the Expansion of Charitable Choice, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1103
(2007).
20. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107
MICH. L. REv. 53, 59 (2008) (explaining the conventional wisdom that there is a "need for
presidential control over bureaucratic policymaking, because the president is the institutional
actor most responsive to the preferences of a national majority").
21. See Peter L. Strauss, Overseer or "The Decider"? The President in Administrative
Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696 (2007).
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Accordingly, this Part asks whether a Scientist-in-Chief furthers the
constitutional values of accountability and efficiency that underpin
unitary executive theory. Part III examines the checks and balances
on the Scientist-in-Chief. It examines how the Courts, Congress,
states, and media sought to check the Scientist-in-Chief and the
effectiveness of these checks. The article concludes that the President
has the potential to focus the public's attention on scientific issues,
thereby fostering transparency, democratic dialogue and debate, and
public understanding of scientific concepts. However, a President
who distorts, suppresses, or manipulates science can undermine all of
these benefits, and when he substitutes his judgment for that of
government scientists, executive accountability suffers.
I. SCIENCE IN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION

The politicization of science needs to be considered separately
from the substantive policy outcomes endorsed by a particular
Administration. People may well disagree over President Bush's
stance on topics such as abstinence education (for it), mercury
emissions (not really that bad), and endangered species (protect only
if no economic interference).22 However, this article asks an
administrative law question: whether the President had the authority
to make decisions on these issues and the processes by which he did
so. For readers who oppose President Bush's agenda, consider a
President directing more agreeable policy decisions. Could he
substitute his judgment for that of the agencies he oversees?
Scientists and the media have raised dozens of allegations of
scientific interference by the Bush Administration. This Part focuses
on only two particularly high-profile examples: climate change and
stem cells. These examples represent decision-making in two
different disciplines-the environment and medicine-and also
reflect the interests of two different Bush constituencies-the fossil
fuel industry and religious conservatives. In addition, while many
allegations of scientific interference have been linked to the Bush
Administration generally, these particular examples have been traced
directly to the White House.

22. See SETH SHULMAN, UNDERMINING SCIENCE: SUPPRESSION AND DISTORTION IN
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION ch. 4, 71-75, ch. 6 (2008) (discussing President Bush's
abstinence, mercury, and endangered species policies, respectively).
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A. Climate Change
Since at least 2001,the scientific consensus has been that human
industrial activity is releasing carbon dioxide and other greenhouse
gases into the atmosphere that are trapping heat and warming the
planet's climate.23 The United States emits more greenhouse gases
Scientists predict dire
than any nation other than China. 24
environmental, health, and economic consequences as a result of
global warming, including rising sea levels along coastlines, unstable
weather patterns, and increases in disease transmission. 25 However,
the Bush Administration continuously sowed uncertainty over the
causes and consequences of global warming. 26
President Bush's policy choices with respect to global warming
reflected his avowed skepticism of the science. 27 His Administration
neither committed to international accords nor adopted mandatory
In January 2001, the
limits on greenhouse gas emissions. 28
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a worldwide
group of 40,000 climatologists established by the United Nations,
issued a report concluding that human activity was a factor in climate
Immediately thereafter, President Bush asked the
change. 29
independent National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to review the
IPCC report. 30 The NAS endorsed the IPCC's conclusions, stating
that the accumulation of greenhouse gases is "causing surface air

23. See id. at 16.
24. See John C. Dembach & Seema Kakade, Climate Change Law: An Introduction, 29
ENERGY L.1. 1,5 (2008).
25. See Lisa Heinzerling, Climate Change, Human Health, and the Post-Cautionary
Principle, 96 GEO. L.J. 445, 447-48 (2008).
26. See Cinnamon Carlame, Climate Change-The New "Superwhale" in the Room:
International Whaling and Climate Change Politics-Too Much in Common? 80 S. CAL. L.
REV. 753, 771 (2007).
27. See Parenteau, supra note 17, at 365.
28. Ken Alex, A Period of Consequences: Global Warming as Public Nuisance, 26A
STAN. ENVTL.LJ. 77, 82-83 (2007) ("To put it mildly, the federal government's response to
global warming has been less than aggressive. The United States imposes no limits of any
kind on any greenhouse gas emissions from any source").
29. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), CLIMATE CHANGE
2001: SYNTHESIS REPORT: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 5 (2001), available at
http://www.ipcc.chlpdf/c1imate-changes-2001/synthesis-spm!synthesis-spm-en.pdf ("There is
new and stronger evidence that most of the warming observed over the last 50 years is
attributable to human activities.").
30. COMM. ON THE SCI. OF CLIMATE CHANGE, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLIMATE
CHANGE SCIENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOME KEY QUESTIONS 27 (2001), available at
http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=1 0 139.
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temperatures and subsurface ocean temperatures to rise.,,31 Despite
the conclusions of these scientific bodies, the Administration
continued to stress scientific uncertainty about global warming. 32 In
2001, President Bush withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol, an
international agreement to reduce greenhouse gases, making the
United States the only developed nation that is a non-signatory?3
Claiming an "incomplete state of scientific knowledge" on global
warming and harmful impact on U.S. economy, he instead endorsed
voluntary caps on greenhouse gas emissions,34 which are unlikely to
be effective. 35 In May 2002, President Bush distanced himself from
an EPA report outlining the predicted affects of global warming,
dismissing it as "put out by the bureaucracy.,,36 Also in 2002,
President Bush decided not to support the reappointment of Dr.
Robert Watson, the Chair of the IPCC, and one of the world's leading
climate scientists. 37
Subsequently, in April 2003, the White House demanded that the
EPA revise the global warming portion of its annual Report on the
Environment. 38 The EPA's initial version of the report linked a
significant rise in global temperatures to human activities. 39 Among
other edits, the White House substituted language from a study

31. Id. at I.
32. See Heinzeriing, supra note 25, at 456; Cariarne, supra note 26, at 771.
33. See SHULMAN, supra note 22, at 17.
34. See Paul Kevin Watennan, Note, From Kyoto to ANWR: Critiquing the Bush
Administration's Withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on
Climate Change, 13 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 749, 751 (2003); Shari L. Diener,
Note, Ratification of Kyoto Aside: How International Law and Market Uncertainty Obviate the
Current Us. Approach to Climate Change Emissions, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2089,2127
(2006). The President said that Kyoto was based on the "unproven science" of global
wanning. President George W. Bush, Remarks on Global Climate Change (June 11,2001), in
37 WKLY COMPo OF PRESIDENTIAL DOC. 876 ("The targets [of Kyoto] were arbitrary and not
based upon science").
35. See Alice Kaswan, The Domestic Response to Global Climate Change: What Role
for Federal, State, and Litigation Initiatives, 42 U.S.F.L. REv. 39,44-45 (2007).
36. See Katherine Q. Seelye, President Distances Himselffrom Global Warming Report,
N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2002, at A23; Bush Withholds Backing of EPA Report on Warming,
WASH. POST, June 5, 2002, at A2.
37. See John Mason, Us. Pressure Forces Removal of Climate Change Chief, FIN.
TIMES (London), Apr. 20, 2002, at 8; John Mason, Us. Defends Strategy on Fighting Global
Warming, FIN. TIMES (London), May 14,2002, at 14.
38. See Jeremy Symons, How Bush and Co. Obscure the Science, WASH. POST, July 13,
2003, at B04; Andrew C. Revkin & Katharine Q. Seeyle, Report by E.P.A. Leaves out Data on
Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES, June 19,2003, at AI.
39. Id.
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funded by the American Petroleum Institute that questioned global
warming, added qualifying language to various conclusions in order
to suggest uncertainty, and eliminated the report's summary statement
that "climate change has global consequences for human health and
the environment.,,4o Rather than make the White House's revisions,
the EPA deleted the entire section on global warming, concluding that
the edits "no lon~er accurately represent[] the scientific consensus on
climate change." I
This and other Administration attempts to downplay global
warming were traced to Philip Cooney, the Chief of Staff to President
Bush's Council on Environmental Quality from 2001-2005.42
Cooney had no scientific credentials; his prior work experience was
as a lawyer for the American Petroleum Institute, the oil industry's
lobbying arm. 43 During his government tenure, there were numerous
instances in which he edited scientific reports by federal agencies to
suggest greater uncertainty over the scientific consensus on global
warming than actually existed. 44 White House officials claimed that
Cooney's edits were merely part of the normal interagency review
process,45 but two days after the story broke in the press, Cooney
resigned. Three days later, he went to work for ExxonMobil. 46
By 2007, the IPCC reported that climate change science was
"unequivocal.,,47 Still, the EPA refused to list carbon dioxide or
greenhouse gases as pollutants under the Clean Air Act, a decision
that was reversed by the Supreme Court. 48 Despite the Court's
opinion, the Bush Administration refused to regulate greenhouse

40. See SHULMAN, supra note 22, at 22-24.
41. See Symons, supra note 38; Revkin & Seeyle, supra note 38.
42. See Andrew C. Revkin, Bush Aide Softened Greenhouse Gas Links to Global
Warming, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2005 at AI.
43. Id.
44. See Andrew C. Revkin, Bush Aide Edited Climate Reports, N.Y. TIMES, June 8,
2005, at A2.
45. Id.
46. See Ex-Bush Aide Plans to Join Exxon Mobil, WASH. POST, June 15,2005, at All;
Andrew C. Revkin, Fomler Bush Aide Who Edited Reports Is Hired by Exxon, N.Y. TIMES,
June IS, 2005, at A I.
47. See Elisabeth Rosenthal & Andrew C. Revkin, Science Panel Says Global Warming
Is 'Unequivocal,' N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2007, at Al (the report asserted with more than 90%
confidence that human-caused greenhouse gases have been the major source of global
warming in the past 50 years).
48. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
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gases. 49 In December 2007, EPA's Associate Deputy Administrator,
Jason Burnett, sent a proposed rule via email to the White House
stating that climate change poses a threat to public welfare and
proposing to limit greenhouse gas emissions. 50 The White House
refused to open the email and demanded that it be recalled. 51 Burnett
resigned his political appointment in protest, explaining,
The White House made it clear they did not want to address the
ramifications of that finding and have decided to leave the
challenge to the next administration. Some [at the White House]
thought that the EPA had mistakenly concluded that climate
change endangers the public. It was no mistake. 52

The EPA ultimately opened a comment period on an advance notice
of proposed rulemaking, thereby pushing any decision into the next
administration. 53 Although Congress attempted to investigate the
EPA's failure to regulate global warming, the White House asserted
executive privilege to protect those documents. 54 In late July 2008,
the EP A relented and allowed a congressional investigatory
committee to read the emails-but not to keep them.55
B. Stem Cells
Stem cells are unspecialized cells that have the capacity to
develop into anyone of the more than 200 different types of cells in
the human body.56 The cells are usually extracted for scientific

49. See Felicity Barringer, E.P.A. Refuses to Regulate GreenhollSe Gases, N.Y. TIMES,
July 11,2008.

50. See Juliet Eilperin, White House Tried to Silence EPA Proposal on Car Emissions,
Agency" Was Responding to Ruling About Clean Air Act, WASH. POST, June 26, 2008; Felicity
Barringer, White House Refused to Open Pollutants E-Mail, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2008.
51. See Eilperin, supra note 50.
52. Id.
53. See Juliet Eilperin & R. Jeffrey Smith, EPA Won't Act on Emissions This Year,
Instead of New Rules, More Comment Sought, WASH. POST, July 11, 2008, at A I. In addition,
in December 2007, over the advice of EPA staff, the EPA Administrator, Steven Johnson,
rejected a waiver by California in which it sought to impose higher emission standards on cars
than the federal government. See Micheline Maynard, E.P.A. Denies California Emission's
Waiver, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19,2007.
54. See Barringer, E.P.A. Refuses to Regulate GreenhollSe Gases, supra note 49.
55. See Juliet Eilperin, EPA E-Mail Concluded Global Warming Endangers Public
Health, Senator Says, WASH. POST, July 25, 2008, at A19.
56. See Yaniv Heled, On Presidents, Agencies, and the Stem Cells Between Them: A

Legal Analysis of President Bush's and the Federal Government's Policy on the Funding of
Research InvolVing Human Embryonic Stem Cells, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 65,68-69 (2008).
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research from excess embryos donated after in vitro fertilization. 57
Scientists believe that these stem cells will someday be used to repair
and replace damaged tissue and that research into stem cells could
someday lead to treatments for diseases such as Parkinson's,
Alzheimer's, diabetes, spinal cord injuries, and heart diseases. 58
The moral and ethical implications of this issue have pitted prolife activists who oppose such research against supporters, including
patients, their families, and researchers. Since 1995, Congress has
annually passed a law called the Dickey Amendment, forbidding
federal financing of research in which embryos are destroyed. 59 As a
result, rules issued during the Clinton Administration allowed federal
funding for scientific research on embryonic stem cells as long as the
cells were not created for research purposes and were not extracted
with federal dollars. 6o Pro-life activists were enraged. 61 Given the
support that pro-life voters gave President Bush, he had no choice but
to wade into the controversy during his early days in office.
Shortly after President Bush took office, the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) halted the review of all grant .
applications under the existing Clinton-era policy, stating that the
agency would conduct a legal review of the issue. 62 The President
was reportedly tom between his commitments to pro-life supporters,
who believe the research is tantamount to murder, and advocates of
stem cell research, who point to its potential lifesaving promise. 63 On
August 9, 2001, after much public deliberation, he announced on
prime time television that he would allow federally financed research
only on stem cells that had already been extracted as of the time of his

57. See SHULMAN, supra note 22, at 131-32. 11,000 embryos have been donated for
research. Id. at 132.
58. Id. at 132.
59. See Susan L. Crockin, The "Embryo" Wars: At the Epicenter of Science, Law,
Religion, and Politics, 39 FAM. L.Q. 599, 620 (2005) (describing the Dickey Amendment)
(citing Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act (OCESAA),
Pub. L. No. 104-99, Title I, § 128, 110 Stat. 26, 34 (1996».
60. See Brenda Reddix-Smalls, Assessing the Market for Human Reproductive Tissue
Alienability: Why Can We Sell Our Eggs But Not Our Livers?, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

643, 656 (2008).
61. See Jody Veenker, New Stem Cell Research Guidelines Criticized, CHRISTIANITY
TODAY, Feb. 7,2000.
62. See Nicholas Wade, Grants for Stem Cell Work Are Delayed, N.Y. TIMES, April 24,
2001.
63. See Robert Pear, Bush Administration Is Split over Stem Cell Research, N.Y. TIMES,
June 13,2001.
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speech, "where the life and death decision has already been made.,,64
In support of this compromise, he stated that there were already 60
diverse stem cell lines that could reproduce themselves indefinitely
and provide ample opportunities for scientific research. 65 Scientists
were immediately skeptical about the President's claim that there
were adequate stem cell lines to conduct research. 66 The estimate
came from a phone survey conducted by the National Institutes of
Health (NIH), rather than peer reviewed assessments. 67 Only two
months previously, NIH reported the existence of only 30 stem cell
lines. 68 A month after the President's announcement, NIH admitted
that fewer than half of the stem cell lines were available for
research. 69 It remains unclear whether President Bush misunderstood
the science or chose to ignore it to bolster his compromise position.
After President Bush issued his decision, he created the
President's Council on Bioethics to advise him on advances in
biomedical science and technology.7o One member was Elizabeth
Blackburn, a world renowned cell biologist, who criticized many of
the Council's conclusions, including its assessment that adult stem
cells could be as effective as embryonic stem cells. 71 Two days after
the UCS issued its report criticizing the Bush Administration's
politicization of science, Blackburn was not reappointed to the
Council, and new members were appointed who held views more in
line with the President's.72 Blackburn's dismissal was widely viewed
64. See Katharine Q. Seelye, The President's Decision: The Overview; Bush Gives His
Backingfor Limited Research on Existing Stem Cells, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10,2001.
65. Id.
66. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, The President's Decision: The Research, u.s. Acts Quickly
To Put Stem Cell Policy in Effect, N.Y. Times, Aug. 11,2001; Sheryl Gay Stolbert, Trying to
Get Past Numbers on Stem Cells, N.Y. Times, at Sept. 7, 2001; Joanna K. Sax, The States
"Race" with the Federal Governmentfor Stem Cell Research, 15 ANNALS HEALTH L. 1, 15
(2006).
67. See SHULMAN, supra note 22, at 132-34.
68. See Rick Weiss, Promising More-and Less: Scientists See Growth in Field, Lament
Limits, WASH. POST, Aug. 10,2001, at AI.
69. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, u.s. Concedes Some Cell Lines Are Not Ready, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 6, 2001.
70. Creation of the President's Council on Bioethics, Exec. Order No. 13,237, 66 Fed.
Reg. 59851 (Nov. 28, 2001).
71. See Elizabeth Blackburn, Bioethics and the Political Distortion of Biomedical
Science, 350 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1379, 1379-80 (2004).
72. See Nicholas Wade, Bush Policy on Human Stem Cells Faces New Challenges, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2004; Rick Weiss, Bush Ejects Two from Bioethics Council: Charges Renew
Criticism That the President Puts Politics Ahead of Science, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2004, at
A6.
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as retaliation over the UCS report, and over 170 bioethicists wrote an
open letter to President Bush protesting her removal. 73
In 2005 and 2007, Congress passed legislation to expand stem
cell research. 74 In each case, the President vetoed the bill and
Congress failed to override the veto. 75 The President's stem cell
policy slowed scientific research in the United States. As the director
of the National, Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute stated, "Progress has
been delayed by the limited number of cell lines. The NIH has ceded
leadership in this field.,,76

II.

DISTORTING SCIENCE OR EXERCISING DISCRETION?

President Bush made headlines as he agonized over stem cell
research and when he issued his final decision. Likewise, he spoke
publicly about· global warming and made important decisions
impacting the nation's climate change policy.77 Although these
particular decisions have sparked waves of protest, there has been
little challenge to the unspoken assumption that the President had
every right to make these decisions. Despite all the brouhaha over the
politicization of science in the Bush Administration, few have asked
why the President gets to make these decisions and whether a
Scientist-in-Chief is desirable and/or lawful. 78
The boundaries of presidential power are murky. Article II of
the Constitution vests executive power in the President, but it says
little about the scope and extent of that power in the domestic
sphere. 79 The President has the authority to appoint "officers" of the
United States, and he can "require the opinion, in writing" of those
Beyond those specifications, Article II directs the
officers. 8o

u.s.

73. See Constance Holden, Researchers Blast
Bioethics Panel Shuffle, 303 SCI.
1447, Mar. 5,2004.
74. See Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act of 2005, H.R. 810, 109th Congo (2005);
Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act of2007, H.R. 3, I 10th Congo (2007).
75. See Charles Babington, Stem Cell Bill Gets Bush's First Veto, WASH. POST, July 20,
2006, at AI; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bush Vetoes Measure on Stem Cell Research, N.Y. TIMES,
June 21, 2007, at A21.
76. See SHULMAN, supra note 22, at 137.
77. See supra Part I.
78. A notable exception is He1ed, supra note 56 (arguing that the President's stem cell
decision lacks legal support).
79. U.S. CaNST. art. II, § I ("The executive power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America").
80. U.S. CaNST. art. II, § 2.
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President to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed.,,81 Not
only is this language vague, but the history surrounding the Take Care
Clause is inconclusive because the Framers themselves disagreed over
As a result, vast
the proper scope of executive power. 82
disagreements over the scope of presidential powers remain
unresolved. This uncertainty creates an opening for Presidents to
justify their domestic policymaking under the Take Care Clause.
Justice Jackson wrote an influential concurrence in Youngstown
Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer83 that sets forth a fluid conception of
Presidential power. At one end of the spectrum, presidential authority
is at its utmost when the President acts pursuant to express or implied
statutory authority.84 At the other end, presidential authority is at "its
lowest ebb" when the President contradicts Congress's wil1. 85
Between these two extremes, there is a "zone of twilight" in which
the President can act where Congress has been silent and where the
President is relying "upon his own independent powers.,,86
Under this framework, the surest justification for the Scientistin-Chief would be if Congress gave the President express authority to
make decisions on greenhouse gases and stem cell research, but, as
this Part explains, there are no such statutes. The Take Care Clause
would also be fulfilled if the President was guiding agencies in
carrying out their statutory mandates. However, the President's
decisions appear to conflict with the governing statutes, placing his
decisions in Jackson's "lowest ebb" category. Accordingly, the
President would likely rely on the theory of the unitary executive to
justify his decisions as a Scientist-in-Chief. Under this theory, the
President has the authority to direct agencies' statutory discretion-

81. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
82. See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1755
(1996) (the narrative of the founding reveals "at the most general level ... people groping
toward a workable conception of government from which only broad purposes can safely be
inferred"); Yvette M. Barksdale. The Presidency and Administrative Value Selection, 42 AM.
U. L. REV. 273, 289-90 (1993) ("Indeed, the vagueness of [Article II] itself may have resulted
from the Framers' failure to agree on a view of executive power").
83. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (holding that
President Truman did not have the power to order the Secretary of Commerce to seize U.S.
steel mills during the Korean War).
84. [d. at 635-36 (Jackson, J., concurring).
85. [d. at 637.
86. [d. at 633-38.
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and possibly to sidestep congressional intent. 87 Yet the justifications
for unitary executive theory do not support a Scientist-in-Chief. This
Part explores each of these possible justifications and explains why
they ultimately fail.
A. Delegations to the President
The clearest justification for the Scientist-in-Chief would be a
congressional statute giving decision-making authority directly to the
President. Typically, Congress legislates with a broad brush and
gives specialized decision-making authority to executive agencies. 88
There are several reasons for these statutory delegations to agencies,
ranging from the desire to have experts make complicated, technical
decisions to an attempt to push politically controversial decisions to
the executive branch. 89 Occasionally, however, Congress grants
discretion specifically to the President rather than to an agency.90
Accordingly, we need to examine the statutes regarding global
warming and stem cells to see whether Congress has delegated
decision-making authority to the President.
1. Global Warming
Congress delegated some authority over global warming to the
President in the National Climate Program Act of 1978,91 which
requires the President to establish a program to "assist the Nation and
the world to understand and respond to natural and man-induced
climate processes and their implications.,,92 This statute authorizes

87. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute
the Laws, 104 YALE L.1. 541 (1994).
88. See RICHARD 1. PIERCE, ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 43--44 (4th
ed.2004).
89. [d.
90. Professor Kevin Stack has identified numerous statutes that expressly give the
President oversight over agency officials, as well as statutes that specifY a particular official
through whom the President must act. See Kevin M. Stack, The President's Statutory Powers
to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 263, 277-82 (2006).
91. Pub. L. No. 95-367, 92 Stat. 601 (1978) (codified at 15 U.S.c. §§ 2901-2908
(2000».
92. 15 U.S.C. § 2902. To carry out the Act, President Carter asked the Climate Research
Board (part of National Academy of Sciences), to investigate climate change. The Council
concluded that global warming was a real phenomenon and that "a wait and see policy may
mean waiting until it is too late." Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1448 (2007)
(quoting Climate Research Board, Carbon Dioxide and Climate: A Scientific Assessment vii
(1979».
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the President to set up research bodies to study the problem of climate
change. 93 It does not impose any binding obligations with regard to
greenhouse gases emissions or give the President the authority to do
SO.94
By contrast, most statutes addressing climate change are
directed at federal agencies. For instance, Congress has enacted
several statutes requiring the EPA to conduct planning, reporting, and
research, but these statutes do not authorize regulation of greenhouse
gas emissions. 95 Instead, regulatory authority can be found in the
Clean Air Act, which gives the EPA Administrator the authority to
regulate air pollutants "which may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare.,,96
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the EPA argued before the Supreme
Court that the Clean Air Act did not grant the agency statutory
authority to regulate greenhouse gases. 97 The Supreme Court
disagreed, stating, "The statute is unambiguous.,,98 Accordingly, the
EPA has the responsibility to determine whether greenhouse gases
contribute to climate change and to make regulatory decisions based
on its conclusions. 99 Neither the text of the Clean Air Act nor
Massachusetts v. EPA directs the President to do anything. 100
Nevertheless, the White House is directing the EPA's current policy
of delay.lOl

93. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2908.
94. Id.
95. Global Climate Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-204, 101 Stat. 1331, note
following 15 U.S.c. § 2901 (1987) (EPA must propose to Congress a "coordinated national
policy on global climate change"); Global Change Research Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101606, 104 Stat. 3096 (1990) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2921-2961 (2000»; Energy Security Act,
Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 611 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C., 15 U.S.c.,
30 U.S.C., 42 U.S.c., and 50 U.S.c. (2000» (directing the Office of Science and Technology
Policy to study the projected impact of carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere); Global
Change Research Program, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2931-2938 (2000) (mandating periodic assessments
of the potential consequences of global change); Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992) (codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., 26 U.S.c.,
30 U.S.C, and 42 U.S.c. (2000» (the Secretary of Energy must report to Congress on a "leastcost energy strategy" to reduce greenhouse gas emissions).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(I) (2000).
97. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1450.
98. Id. at 1460.
99. [d. at 1463.
100. See id. (discussing 42 U.S.c. § 7521(a)(I».
101. By contrast, the President has the authority to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol.
The "Treaty Clause" of the Constitution gives the President the "power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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2. Stem Cells
The statutory framework with regard to stem cell research is
more straightforward. Since 1995, Congress has annually attached a
rider, known as the Dickey Amendment, to the HHS appropriations
bill banning federal funding for research in which "a human embryo
or embryos are destroyed, discarded, or knowingly subjected to risk
of injury or death[.]"lo2 However, this statute does not bar federal
funding of research on stem cell lines that were derived from embryos
without federal support. I03 In other words, if the stem cell lines have
already been created, federal researchers may use them.
Congress has specifically granted authority to the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) to make funding policies for federal
research grants in accord with the National Institutes of Health
Revitalization Act of 1993 (NIHRA).lo4 The NIHRA provides that
the NIH may not withhold funds for research because of ethical
considerations unless it convenes an Ethics Advisory Board and the
majority of the board recommends the withholding of such funds. lo5
The Board must consist of between 14 and 20 individuals who do not
work for the federal government and who possess "special
qualifications and competence to provide
advice
and
recommendations regarding ethical matters in biomedical and
behavioral research.,,106 In addition, at least one-third and no more
than one-half "shall be scientists with substantial accomplishments in
biomedical or behavioral research."lo7 This statute was "intended to
prohibit unilateral actions that block research approved by the merit
review system," and to prohibit "unreasonable prohibitions . . .
imposed in an arbitrary manner on exceptional and promising
research." 108 As a result of the NIHRA, all meritorious scientific

102. The Balanced Budget Downpayment Act, I, Pub. L. No. 104-99, § 128(2), 110 Stat.
26,34 (1996).
103. See Heled, supra note 56, at 77-78.
104. Pub. L. No. 103-43, 107 Stat. 122 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 289a-1 (2000)).
Congress passed this statute after HHS Secretary Louis Sullivan rejected the advice of an
advisory committee and put a moratorium on federal funding for research involving human
fetal tissue. See Heled, supra note 56, at 72-75.
105. 42 U.S.C. § 289a-l(b) (The Secretary can also withhold funds if the majority of the
advisory board recommends funding, but the Secretary determines the decision is arbitrary and
capricious).
106. 42 U.S.c. § 289a-l(b)(5).
107. /d.

108. S. REP. NO. 103-2, at 13 (1993).
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research must be funded, unless it is withheld pursuant to the
requirements ofthe statute. 109
Neither the Dickey Amendment nor the NIHRA provide a role
for the President to weigh in on funding decisions regarding
biomedical research. Nevertheless, President Bush bypassed this
process and made clear that his stem cell decision was his and his
alone. In his televised address to the nation, he said, "I have
concluded that we should allow Federal funds to be used for research
on these existing stem cell lines .... I have made this decision with
great care, and I pray it is the right one."IIO The authority he asserted
cannot be found in any statute.
B. President as Overseer

In lieu of direct statutory authority, the President might argue
that he was acting in an oversight role to ensure that federal agencies
carry out congressional intent. No theorist doubts that this oversight
Indeed, it is
role is well within the President's purview.
constitutionally compelled by the Take Care Clause, which
commands the President to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed. III However, President Bush's "oversight" appears to
conflict with the mandates of these statutes.
To be sure, Congress has not enacted global warming legislation
directly mandating reduced emissions, nor has it supported
ratification of the Kyoto Protoco1. 112 Thus, President Bush might
have argued that his direction to the EPA was not given as a Scientistin-Chief, but rather to carry out congressional intent. In other words,
if Congress had not taken action against global warming, why should
the executive branch?
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the EPA made a similar argument,
relying heavily on FDA v. Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corp., in

109. See Heled, supra note 56, at 94.
110. President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on Stem Cell Research from
Crawford, Texas (Aug. 9,2001), in 37 WKLY COMPo OF PRESIDENTIAL DOc. 1149.
Ill. See Mary M. Cheh, When Congress Commands a Thing to Be Done: An Essay on
Marbury v. Madison, Executive Inaction, and the Duty of the Courts to Enforce the Law, 72
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 253, 275 (2003).
112. Concerned that developing countries were not being held to account on the issue,
the Senate passed a resolution stating its opinion that the United States should not be a
signatory to any protocol that did not include binding targets and timetables for developing
nations or that "would result in serious harm to the U.S. economy." S. Res. 98, \05th Congo
(1997).
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which the Supreme Court held that the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) could not regulate (and thereby ban) tobacco in light of a
lengthy legislative history in which Congress passed many laws
concerning tobacco, but did not ban it. JJ3 The Massachusetts v. EPA
Court rejected the Brown and Williamson Corp. analogy, ruling that
EPA regulation of greenhouse gases would not conflict with any
congressional action. 114 Unlike the FDA, which had repeatedly
disclaimed the authority to regulate tobacco, the EPA had never
previously disclaimed authority to regulate greenhouse gases. 115
Thus, the statutes in each area were enacted against quite different
backdrops. As the Court stated, the fact that subsequent Congresses
"have eschewed enacting binding emissions limitations to combat
global warming tells us nothing about what Congress meant when it"
enacted and amended the Clean Air Act. I 16
Still, prior to Massachusetts v. EPA, it is fair to say that the
President had a meritorious argument that he was not defying
congressional intent. Although the Supreme Court distinguished
Brown and Williamson Corp., that was not a foregone conclusion, and
indeed, the D.C. Circuit agreed with the EP A.l17 However, in light of
Massachusetts v. EPA, the presidential oversight argument no longer
works, i.e., the President cannot say he is carrying out the will of
Congress when he delays regulatory action. Nevertheless, the Bush
White House continued to discourage EPA from regulating
greenhouse gases. 118
On stem cell research, President Bush's final compromise
position seems fairly consistent with the wishes of Congresses that
have enacted stem cell legislation. The repeated passage of the
Dickey Amendment demonstrates Congress's wariness about stem
cell research. 119 Yet the President's unilateral takeover of this
decision conflicts squarely with the NIHRA, which requires the
formation and input of an Ethics Advisory Board before research
funds are withheld for scientific research. 120 Congressional intent
here is clear-neither the President nor the agency head may go it
1l3. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1450 (2007).
Id. at 1461--62.
!d.
Id. at 1460.
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 58 (O.c. CiT. 2005).
See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
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alone. The executive branch must put together an Advisory Board
representing diverse scientific perspectives on the issue and
implement the recommendations of that Board unless they are
arbitrary and capricious. By taking over this function, the President is
in clear violation of a law that on its face negates any concept of a
Scientist-in-Chief.
As an alternative, the President might assert that he is
supervising the agencies pursuant to the Data Quality Act (DQA).121
The DQA requires the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)located within the Executive Office of the President-to issue
guidance to federal agencies to ensure the "quality, objectivity, utility,
and integrity of information disseminated" to the public. 122 To
achieve these goals, agencies must allow the public to seek correction
of information that they allege fails to comply with the OMB
guidelines. 123
In other words, if someone is unhappy with
government scientific research, they can essentially petition that the
research be changed or withdrawn. For instance, an anti-regulatory
think tank filed DQA challenges demanding that three federal
agencies withdraw the National Assessment on Climate Change, an
interagenc~ report about the role of greenhouse gases in global
warming. I 4 The OMB guidelines further mandate peer review for
scientific information that has a m~ior monetary impact or is "novel,
controversial or precedent-setting[.]"125 The DQA was adopted
without hearings or debates as a rider to a large 2001 federal
appropriations bill, and drafted by a lobbyist for private industry .126
Not surprisingly, the DQA, as well as the peer review guidelines,
121. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001,
Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763, note following 44 U.S.C. § 3516 (2001). The Act is also
known as the Infonnation Quality Act.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Thomas McGarity, Defending Clean Science from Dirty Attacks, in RESCUING
SCIENCE FROM POLITICS: REGULATION AND THE DISTORTION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 21,
40 (Wendy Wagner & Rena Steinzor, eds., 2006). The White House Office of Science and
Technology denied the petition. The Competitive Enterprise Institute think tank sued the
President, and a settlement was reached in which the government placed a disclaimer on the
NACC report stating the report had not been prepared in accordance with the DQA
requirements. Id.
125. Final Infonnation Quality Bulletin for Peer Review, 70 Fed. Reg. 2664, 2666 (Jan.
14,2005).
126. The author of the bill was Jim Tozzi, a lobbyist for the tobacco industry. See
Donald T. Honstrein, The Data Wars. Adaptive Management. and the Irony of "Sound
Science," in RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS, supra note 124, at 103, 112-13.
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have been very controversial. 127 Proponents believe it will further
"sound science," by standardizing agency science and making
agencies accountable for basing decisions on quality information. 128
Anti-regulatory forces have long alleged that agencies are overregulating based on '~junk science.,,129 DQA opponents argue that it is
a tactic for delaying regulation and allowing politics to override
agency expertise, especially considering that OMB lacks the scientific
expertise possessed by the agencies it reviews. 130
Given that OMB is subject to the control of the President, one
could view President Bush's caution on global warming and stem cell
research as a way of promoting "sound science," in keeping with the
goals of the DQA and similar statutes that aim to improve and
standardize agency decision-making. The irony, however, is that the
President's rejection of global warming science runs counter to
extensively peer reviewed science, and his misstatement abou: the
available number of stem cell lines was based on faulty information
gleaned through a phone survey rather than peer reviewed reports. l3l
Thus, the President appears to be acting contrary to the substantive
goals of the DQA, i.e., he is not furthering sound science. Moreover,
the DQA does not give OMB authority to "correct" faulty science;
rather, it relies on peer review and the threat of private challenges to
ensure quality science. While the DQA gives the public the chance to
challenge agency science, it does not give the President the authority
to reverse scientific determinations.

127. See David S. Caudill, Images of Expertise: Converging Discourses on the Use and
.Abuse of Science in Massachusetts v. EPA, 18 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 185, 200-03 (2007)
(outlining arguments for and against).
128. See, e.g., James W. Conrad, The Information Quality Act-Antiregulatory Costs of
Mythic Proportions? 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 521, 526 (2003) (commenting that prior to
the Data Quality Act the federal governrnent lacked "clear accountability for governrnental use
of information to accomplish policy goals").
129. See Wendy E. Wagner, The "Bad Science" Fiction: Reclaiming the Debate over
the Role of Science in Public Health and Environmental Regulation, 66 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 63 (2003); Thomas O. McGarity, Our Science Is Sound Science and Their Science Is
Junk Science: Science-Based Strategies for Avoiding Accountability and Responsibility for
Risk-ProdUcing Products and Activities, 52 U. KAN. L. REv. 897, 901 (2004) (arguing that
junk science claims "are artfully framed appeals to scientific objectivity that carefully avoid
the appearance of self-interest. In reality, neither claim is well-grounded in fact.").
130. See Stephen M. Johnson, Junking the "Junk Science" Law: Reforming the
Information Quality Act, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 37 (2006); McGarity, Our Science Is Sound
Science, supra note 129, at 934-36 (arguing that the DQA will encourage corpuscular attacks
on agency decisions).
131. See supra notes 23-25, 67 and accompanying text.
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In sum, the President cannot point to a statute that gives him the
authority to make decisions about global warming or stem cells.
Moreover, his decisions conflict with the substantive mandate of the
Clean Air Act (regulate harmful vehicle emissions) and the
procedural mandate of the NIHRA (appoint an advisory body to study
the issue). As a result, unitary executive theory is the only possible
justification for the Scientist-in-Chief.
C. Directory Authority

Presidential directory authority is a more expansive theory to
support a Scientist-in-Chief. Under this view of Article II, as long as
a statute grants an agency decision-making discretion, the President
can direct the agency's outcome. 132 This argument derives from the
concept of the President as the unitary executive. 133 The President is
at the apex of the executive branch; all executive officers serve in his
stead; and thus, the President can direct the outcome of the executive
officers' exercise of delegated powers. 134 Unitary executive
enthusiasts have argued from both originalist and normative positions,
but both viewpoints hinge on the values of accountability and
efficiency. Originalists argue that the constitutional text, structure,
and enactment history prove the Framers' intent "to construct a
unitary Executive since they felt it was conducive to energy, dispatch,
and responsibility.,,135 Non-originalists contend that although the
Framers never foresaw the growth of the modem administrative state
and thus did not consider directory authority, modem reality demands
fidelity to the constitutional commitments of accountability and
efficiency. 136
By contrast, opponents of directory authority view agencies as
the delegates of Congress rather than instruments of the executive. In
this view, the Framers "believed that the President would be a
132. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 87, 570 ("the Constitution unambiguously
gives the President the power to control the execution of all federal laws").
133. See David 1. Barron, From Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative Law in
an Age ofAgency Politicization, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1095, 1107-1008 (2008) (describing
unitary executive theory and its relationship to the administrative state).
134. See id.
135. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 87, at 639.
136. See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94
COLUM. L. REv. I (1994). Likewise, Elana Kagan doubts that a unitary executive is
constitutionally compelled, but agrees that the "the values of accountability and effectiveness
[are] the principal values that all models of administration must attempt to further." Elana
Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REv. 2245, 2252 (2001).
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managerial agent for the legislature rather than an independent source
of domestic policy.,,137 Further, concentration of power within the
executive runs counter to the Framers' goal of avoiding tyranny by
balancing and dispersing power among the branches. 138 The Framers
were less concerned with accountability than "with making the
machinery of government somewhat cumbersome, thus ensuring
against the hegemony of one branch or person.,,139 The text of the
Take Care Clause also supports this managerial viewpoint. It
instructs the President to ensure "that the laws are faithfully
executed,,,140 but does not give him the power to execute those laws
himself. The wording of the Clause presumes that executive
subordinates will be carrying out Congress's mandates under the
President's watchful eye. Its emphasis on faithfulness assumes that
presidential power will be used to further fidelity to externally defined
norms-not those of the President alone. Moreover, Congress's
occasional direct delegations to the President "support the negative
inference that when Congress simply delegates to an agency ... the
statute denies the President directive authority.,,141
Supreme Court cases variously-and irreconcilably-reflect
both views. Unitary executive supporters line up behind Myers v.
United States, Bowsher v. Synar, and INS v. Chadha-decisions that
limit Congress's ability to intrude on executive authority.142 Yet
despite broad language in these cases, the Supreme Court has made
clear that the President's power is not as absolute as the unitary
executive proponents would have it. 143 For instance, the Court has
upheld the existence of independent agencies whose heads are
insulated from presidential removal as well as independent counsels
that also exercise powers outside the President's control. l44 These
137. Morton Rosenberg, Beyond the Limits of Executive Power: Presidential Control of
Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 80 MICH. L. REv. 193,202-203 (1981).
138. See Flaherty, supra note 82, at 1741.
139. Abner Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U.
CHI. L. REV. 123, 177(1994).
140. U.S. CONST. art. II.
141. Stack, supra note 90, at 284.
142. Meyers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (Congress cannot limit President's
removal powers); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (legislative officer cannot hold
executive powers); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (legislative veto is unconstitutional).
143. See source infra note 146.
144. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding office of the independent
counsel); Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (upholding the
constitutionality of the independent agencies).
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cases rebut the idea that the President can command all forms of
administrative discretion. Nevertheless, President Clinton made bold
claims of directory authority in order to push his agenda in the face of
a recalcitrant Congress; he "treated the sphere of regulation as his
own, and in doing so made it his own, in a way no other modem
President had done.,,145 President Bush expanded on Clinton's
foundation, aggressively issuing Executive Orders and signing
statements that solidify the unitary executive. 146
Along these lines, in January 2007, President Bush issued
Executive Order (EO) 13422, which put agencies more firmly under
political control. I47 Under EO 13422, each agency must have a
presidential appointee, called a Regulatory Planning Officer (RPO) ,
who is charged with approving all rulemakings before they begin. 148
Under a prior EO, RPOs reported to the head of the agency, and that
agency head was charged with approving the agency's regulatory
plan. 149 By contrast, the new EO requires "the approval of an official
loyal to the Administration before an agency takes action, [and] these
changes threaten to disturb the difficult but necessary balance
between politicians and experts, between politics and law, that
characterizes agency rulemaking.,,15o When science is added to the
mix, the control of a political appointee becomes even more
troublesome because "objectivity, independence and transparency are
central to the development of high-quality science.,,151 Mandatory
political oversight runs counter to science's central value of
disinterested inquiry .152
In addition, certain constitutional values can suffer when the
President directs scientific outcomes. A Scientist-in-Chief (even one
relying on accurate science) threatens to undermine norms of public
145. Kagan, supra note 136, at 2281.
146. See Michael P. Allen, George W. Bush and the Nature of Executive Authority: The
Role of Courts in a Time of Constitutional Change, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 871,872-74 (2007)
(describing actions taken by President Bush pursuant to broad assertions of executive power).
147. Exec. Order 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 23, 2007).
148. Id.
149. See Strauss, supra note 21, at 701-02.
150. Id. See also Neal Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.1. 2314, 2323 (2006) ("By squelching
bureaucracy, the President guarantees that information given to him is not the product of
independent and sober thought but rather data selectively filtered by loyalists").
151. Wendy Wagner & Rena Steinzor, Introduction to RESCUING SCIENCE FROM
POLITICS, supra note 124, at 9 (2006).
152. Id.
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participation in agency decision-making and to undervalue agency
expertise in favor of presidential commitments to special interests.
Although lawyers and politicians have tried to idealize science, it is
not a field of objective truths. Instead, science relies on core values
of honesty and transparency, given that scientific knowledge is
always advancing and building upon the shoulders of others. 153 Antiregulatory forces demand certainty before science is deemed sound,
but "research by its nature is incomplete.,,154 Uncertainty is part of
scientific inquiry, and many environmental and public health statutes
acknowledge this by adopting a precautionary principle that allows
regulation on the basis of anticipated harm. 155 By contrast, a
Scientist-in-Chief who distorts science or overstates uncertainty
causes further damage by making bad policy, demoralizing
government scientists, and misinforming the public about important
issues, which in turn, harms the democratic process because citizens
end up debating with faulty information. In short, a Scientist-in-Chief
runs counter to constitutional commitments to checks and balances,
participatory norms, and restraints on arbitrariness.

1. Accountability
Although a Scientist-in-Chief can impinge on the constitutional
values described above, the question remains whether the Scientist-inChief fulfills the separate values of accountability and efficiency that
underlie unitary executive theory. Accountability is "the ability of
one actor to demand an explanation or justification of another actor
for its actions and to reward or punish that second actor on the basis
of its performance or its explanation.,,156 Unitary executive theorists
argue that presidential decision-making fosters accountability because
the President has a broad, national perspective, one not shared by
bureaucrats who operate within the narrow zone of their expertise. 157
153. Susan Haack, Of Truth. in Science and in Law, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 985, 998
(2008).
154. Hornstein, supra note 126, at 104.
155. See Sidney A. Shapiro, OMB and the Politicization of Risk Assessment, 37 ENVTL.
L. 1083, 1087 (2007). "If uncertainty is a conventional aspect of nonnal science, then the
abuse on the part of those who make unreasonable demands of science is in highlighting
uncertainty as ifit signals bad science." See Caudill, supra note 127, at 198.
156. Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse,
103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2073 (2005).
157. See Lloyd N. Cutler & David R. Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84
YALE L.J. 1395, 1405-06 (1975) (noting that regulation often involves political choices rather
than solely technical decisions).
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Moreover, most bureaucrats are unelected and hidden from view,
while the President is directly accountable to the entire electorate. 158
Thus, the President is in the best position to consider how policy
decisions will play out on a national stage. And, if citizens are
unhappy with his decisions, they can punish or reward him at the
ballot box.
However, these benefits do not necessarily accrue when a
Scientist-in-Chief takes scientific decisions away from federal
agencies. To be sure, the President's decisions with regard to global
warming and stem cell research have been transparent to the public,
and transparency is essential to accountability. Moreover, these
decisions did not rely solely on science; they also raised economic,
moral, and ethical questions that the President is usually in a better
position to evaluate than agency scientists. Yet, the President's
distortions and suppression of the science underlying his decisions
misinformed the public about current scientific knowledge. 159 If
citizens do not have accurate information, it is hard for them to hold
the source accountable. One could agree with the President's
policies, but still wish his justifications were honest and accurate. For
instance, the President could have endorsed the science on global
warming, but argued that for economic reasons, he does not support
reduced emissions. 16o Likewise, he could have said that even though
there were limited stem cell lines available for research, he simply
was not going to support the creation of additional lines for ethical or
moral reasons. Instead, he appears to have used science to give a
false veneer of objectivity to his decision-making. 161
The idea of accountability via the ballot box is also questionable.
Scientific issues are often complex, confusing, and not easily reduced
to sound bites. This means that many Americans may not be aware
when politicians distort or suppress current scientific knowledge. In
158. [d.
159. See supra Part I (discussing the President's public statements about global warming
and stem celIs).
160. See SHULMAN, supra note 22, at 18 ("[Blush Administration officials could have
furthered their stance in a forthright manner. ").
161. Wagner & Steinzor, supra note 151, at 15 ("In the regulatory context, decision
makers have often found that the best way to avoid attack is to be coy about the underlying
trade-offs made in reaching a regulation: Science provides a perfect foil for obfuscating the
underlying policy choices."). As Holly Doremus has described, "The core of the problem is
not the involvement of politics but its concealment behind a cloak of science." Holly
Doremus, Science Plays Defense: Natural Resources Management in the Blish Administration,
32 ECOLOGY L. Q. 249, 253 (2005).
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any event, research shows that voters do not cast ballots based on how
the President acts on specific policy issues. 162 Rather, they elect
someone who they consider like-minded, in part, so they do not have
to monitor the "quotidian decisions, complex judgments, recondite
bargains, and other actions" that are "beyond their . . . attention
span.,,163 This is the "opposite of accountability.,,164 In the 2000
election, it was not clear whether or how Bush would confront these
scientific decisions. During the 2000 campaign he stated that global
warming was real,165 and he also stated that he would end all
embryonic stem cell research, a position he did not ultimately
adopt. 166 Further, by the 2004 election, the media had reported
widely on the politicization of science. 167 Voters conceivably could
have punished the President for his scientific decisions; however, the
most important factors for voters were party affiliation, foreign policy
and economic priorities. 168 Even the most ardent supporters or
vehement opponents of the President's science decisions, those who
single-handedly voted on global warming or stem cells alone,
probably could not have impacted the 2004 election. For all these
reasons, "intermittent, highly contested elections are simply very poor
devices for holding a person accountable.,,169
Some might argue that presidential accountability means
fulfilling the public will. The President's "national constituency"
means that he looks to the "preferences of the general public, rather
than merely parochial interests. ,,170 Yet even if you accept this view
of accountability, President Bush could not justify his global warming
and stem cell decisions as reflecting majoritarian preferences. For
instance, a 2006 poll found that almost seven in ten Americans felt

162. See Rubin, supra note 156, at 2078.
163. Id. See also Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and
Personnel Before a New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 557, 617-19 (2003) (explaining
why elections do not guarantee that the President will be guided by popular preferences).
164. Rubin, supra note 156, at 2078.
165. See, e.g., Tom Kenworthy, Environmental Canyon Lies Between Nominees, U.S.A.
TODAY, Nov. 3, 2000, at 13A ("Once a skeptic on whether the Earth is warming, Bush now
says 'the science proves there's global warming. "').
166. See Mary Leonard, Abortion Foes See Politics in Stem-Cell Study Policy, BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 24, 2000, at Al (describing Bush's position against stem cell research).
167. See, e.g., the newspaper articles cited supra in notes to Part I.
168. See D. Sunshine Hillygus & Todd G. Shields, Moral Issues and Voter DecisionMaking in the 2004 Presidential Election, POL. SCI. AND POL. 201,207 (2005).
169. Rubin, supra note 156, at 2079.
170. Kagan, supra note 136, at 2335.
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the government was not doing enough to stem global warming. 171
Multiple polls also showed that a clear m~iority of Americans favor
embryonic stem cell research. l72 This suggests that President Bush
was responding to interest group influence, rather than looking out for
the public's interest. Avoidance of faction is supposed to one of the
benefits of a unitary executive-not one of its dangers.173
Even if the President's decisions were supported by polling data,
one may well query whether we want a president who rules by pollparticularly when the complexities of science are added to the mix. 174
Science is not a matter of public opinion; its processes are entirely
different. The normative structure of science "includes a shared set of
goals for uncovering the truths about the natural world, the
recognition that science is a social activity that demands openness and
transparency of claims and evidence, and the commitment to an
epistemology that embodies a standard of empirical verifiability for
certifying knowledge claims."175
Accountability is better fostered
when
there
are
"multiple pressure points within the bureaucracy, a diffusion of policy
making influence, public dialogue, and a general fluidity in the value
structure that guides the bureaucracy's decision-making.,,176 Agency
decision-making processes generally fulfill this VISIon of
accountability. Agencies study external scientific research, conduct
their own research, are subject to sunshine laws,177 provide public
notice of their proposed decisions, accept public comment on
proposed rules, meet the requirements of Federal Advisory
171. Poll: Americans See a Climate Problem, TIME, March 26, 2006.
172. See, e.g, Science and Nature, http://www.pollingreport.com/science.htm (last
visited Feb. 7, 2009).
173. See Stephen G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive,
48 ARK. L. REv. 23, 47 (1995) ("Accountability, resulting from the creation of a unitary
executive, was seen as promoting faction control by making the executive clearly responsible
to and representative of the interests of the whole of his national, electoral constituency").
174. See William N. Eskridge, Jf. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96
GEO. L.1. 1083, 1177 (2008) ("Is legitimacy in our constitutional system the product of
nothing but majoritarian preferences?").
175. Sheldon Krimsky, Publication Bias, Data Ownership, and the Funding of Science:
Threats to the Integrity of Biomedical Research, in RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS, supra
note 124, at 61.
176. Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances: The
Case of Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161,212 (1995).
177. For an overview of open government legislation, see PIERCE, ET AL., supra note 88,
§ 9.4.
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Committee Act, hold stakeholder and regional meetings, are subject
to greater media coverage than the President, and have regular direct
interaction with public. 178 Agencies "gather more public input and
receive more public scrutiny" than the President and are also subject
to judicial review. 179
Layered on top of these agency processes are the multiple checks
that exist within the field of scientific inquiry. "The evidence with
respect to scientific claims and theories is usually very complex,
ramifying in every direction.,,18o As a result,
science often depends on the reliable working of instruments of
various kinds, or on the soundness of elaborate statistical
techniques or computer programs; and it is almost always the work
of many people-whether collaborators or rivals, and whether
working together or many miles or decades apart-who rely,
explicitly or implicitly on the competence and honesty of others
involved. 181
Of course, science is subject to its own corrupting influences, but its
norms embody accountability. By contrast, President Bush's stem cell
decision sidestepped a statutorily mandated process for input by an
Ethics Advisory Board. His Administration's interference with global
warming science obfuscated research by creating uncertainty where
there is none. It is difficult to square these decisions with any
defensible notion of accountability.
.

2. Efficiency
What about efficiency? Unitary executive theorists point out
that the President is uniquely situated to coordinate efforts across the
federal bureaucracy.182 In addition, due to the spotlight generated by
his national position, the President can center attention on a specific
issue and bring energy to its resolution. In The Federalist, Alexander
Hamilton articulated this idea: "Energy in the executive is a leading
character in the definition of good government." I 83 With regard to the
administrative state in particular, the Supreme Court in Myers
178. See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative
State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 80-83
(2006); Haack, supra note 153, at 996.
179. Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 178, at 83.
180. Haack, supra note 153, at 996.
181. Id.
182. See Calabresi, supra note 173, at 37-38.
183. THE FEDERALlSTNO. 70, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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endorsed the "unity and coordination in executive administration [that
is] essential to effective action.,,184 A modem perspective links
presidential control with "a number of so-called technocratic values:
cost-effectiveness, consistency, and rational priority-setting.,,185
Thus, the notion of efficiency captures the benefits attached to a
single, national leader-particularly as a way to counter the sprawl of
the administrative state.
Acting as a Scientist-in-Chief, President Bush fulfilled some
aspects of efficiency. He acted decisively in announcing his own
scientific views and in making policy decisions based on those views.
His command of the bully pulpit meant that he also focused the
attention of the nation on these issues when he chose to do so.
Indeed, many political commentators thought that President Bush's
stem cell decision, which followed weeks of public deliberation, was
designed to paint President Bush in a favorable light as particularly
thoughtful and wise. 186 Moreover, a positive spin on EO 13422
(putting agencies firmly under political control) is that it will
coordinate agency output, reduce duplication, and give agencies better
However, the White House often gave agencies
guidance. 187
conflicting messages and orders, as a study of the EPA revealed. 188
Given the thousands of agency decisions being made at any time and
the limited personnel capacity of the White House, the
Administration's attention to regulatory issues was haphazard,
sporadic, and inconsistent. 189 Coordination may be a goal, but it is
aspirational rather than actual. Moreover, the model of a vigorous
executive "presumes an active Congress as an overseer of presidential
decision-making,,,190 and, as is discussed below, we did not have a
Congress that resisted executive aggrandizement. 191 To the degree
Framers feared "a feeble executive, [they] did not imagine an

184. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 134 (1926).
185. Kagan, supra note 136, at 2339.
186. See Katharine Q. Seelye with Frank Bruni, The President's Decision: A Long
Process That Led Bush to His Decision, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11,2001.
187. Rob Portman, OMB, Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies, and Independent Regulatory Agencies (Apr. 25, 2007), available at
http://www. whitehouse.gov/omb/memorandalfy2007/m07 -13 .pdf.
188. See Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 178, at 94-96.
189. See id.
190. Katyal, supra note 150, at 2344.
191. See infra Part III.B.
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executive who had 'only' 2.6 million employees and fifteen cabinet
secretari es." 192
Moreover, efficiency can be a double-edged sword when it
comes to regulatory decisions that rely upon science. The attribute of
efficiency is particularly compelling in foreign affairs, where the
United States needs to speak with a single voice, and in times of
emergency, where executive delay can have tragic costS.1 93 However,
it is not clear that efficiency should trump other constitutional values
when it comes to scientific determinations, which are made through
entirely different processes. Science develops within a "community
of inquirers," who share "a methodology that might include
measuring instruments, theoretical frameworks, nomenclature,
quantitative methods of analysis, and canonical principles for
interpreting data.,,194 Government efficiency comes at the cost of
accuracy and fairness-hallmarks of both administrative and
scientific processes. Notably, when Congress designed the NIHRA
grant process that applies to stem cell research, it did not want
efficiency. 195 It wanted scientific expertise and input. 196 While
executive coordination among agencies is desirable, the value of
efficiency does not support the idea of a Scientist-in-Chief.
III. CHECKS AND BALANCES
The Scientist-in-Chief model of presidential authority does not
appear to foster democratic accountability or efficiency and it can
override other values, such as checks and balances, limitations on
arbitrariness, and democratic participation in government. Yet, the
President does not exist in a vacuum. The concentration of executive
power is less dangerous if it is checked by adequate counterbalances.
The Framers' vision was a government whose branches are in tension,
such that no single branch dominates. Accordingly, this Part explores
the checks and balances on the Scientist-in-Chief, including the
courts, Congress, federalism, and the media.

192. Katyal, supra note 150, at 2344-45.
193. See id. at 2326 (noting the need for executive dispatch in certain circumstances, but
warning that this "should not preclude ex post examination of executive conduct by agencies
sharing jurisdiction").
194. Krimsky, supra note 175, at 63.
195. See supra Part II.A.2 (describing the funding process under NIHRA).
196. [d.
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A. The Courts

Parties unhappy with government action often tum to the courts.
However, judicial standards of review are generally deferential, and
thus, it is not easy to convince a court to overturn a regulatory
decision. 197 Under the Chevron doctrine, courts must defer to agency
statutory interpretations that are reasonable. 198 Further, although an
agency's factual determinations are subject to a court's "hard look,"
this usually requires no more than that the agency provide a reasoned
explanation for its decision. 199 Thus, regulatory attorneys know that
they need to prevail at the agency level rather than counting on a win
later down the road. It is against this conventional wisdom that
Massachusetts v. EPA,200 the Supreme Court's rebuke to the EPA on
climate change, shocked the agency and the President.
The case began in 1999, when a coalition of environmental
groups petitioned EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from
new motor vehicles under the Clean Air Act. 201 In 2003, EPA denied
the rulemaking petition, asserting that it lacked statutory authority to
regulate greenhouse gases; that the causal link between the
greenhouse effect and global warming could not be "unequivocally
established"; and that any regulation would be unwise for policy
reasons. 202 The plaintiffs joined with several states and local
jurisdictions and sued EPA. 203 The Circuit Court for the District of
Columbia upheld EPA's decision. 204
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court rejected EPA's
statutory argument, reasoning that the statutory mandate in the Clean
Air Act was unambiguous. 205 The Court further stressed fidelity to
congressional design by limiting EPA's discretion to factors set forth
in the statute. EPA raised a "laundry list of reasons not to regulate,"

197. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 174, at 1100, 1122 (explaining that agencies win
68.8% of the time before the Supreme Court and that agency affirmance rates are even higher
before the lower federal courts).
198. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44
(1984).
199. Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass'n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 42-43 (1983).
200. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. 1438 (2007).
201. [d. at 1449.
202. [d. at 1450-51.
203. [d. at 1451.
204. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50,58 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
205. 127 S. Ct. at 1460.
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including the existence of voluntary executive branch programs,
potential constraints on the President's ability to negotiate with
developing nations, and avoidance of a piecemeal approach to climate
change regulation. 206 However, the Court stated that the statute did
not permit these policy considerations, and thus, they could not be the
basis of EPA's decision not to regulate?07 The Court also addressed
the issue of scientific uncertainty, stating, "If the scientific uncertainty
is so profound that it precludes EPA from making a reasoned
judgment as to whether greenhouse gases contribute to global
warming, EPA must say SO.,,208 The Court remanded to EPA to make
a scientific judgment and thus reserved ruling on the substantive issue
of whether greenhouse gases "endanger public health or welfare.,,209
The Court also left for another day the degree to which policy
concerns could inform EPA's actions if EPA did make an
endangerment finding. 2IO
lody Freeman and Adrian Vermeule have described the Court's
approach in Massachusetts v. EPA as "expertise-forcing." 211 As they
explain, the Supreme Court, well aware of and concerned about the
politicization of agency decision-making under the Bush
Administration, became disenchanted with the accountability
rationale for executive power and reinstated a divide between
agencies and politics. 212 The Court's unspoken assumption in
Massachusetts v. EPA is that politics and science are at odds and that
science needs protection from political interference. This view is in
stark contrast to the assumptions that fuel Chevron deference. Under
Chevron, political control of agencies is desirable because it fosters
democratic accountability.213 The case studies in this article likewise
suggest that an expertise-forcing philosophy can lead to more
meaningful accountability.
This does not mean, however, that the judicial branch alone can
curb a Scientist-in-Chief run amuck. To begin with, many disputes

206. !d. at 1462-63.
207. !d. at 1463.
208. [d.
209. ld. at 1462-63.
210. !d. at 1463.
211. See Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to
Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 52 (2007).
212. See id. at 54.
213. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66
(1984) (the executive branch is more "directly accountable to the people").
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will never reach the courts. For instance, whether due to the costs of
litigation, the time commitment required, or fears of retaliation, no
one has stepped forward to challenge President Bush's stem cell
policy.214 During the Clinton Administration, an evangelical group
called Nightlife Christian Adoptions sued HHS to challenge President
Clinton's stem cell policy.215 However, when President Bush took
office five months later, the federal district court stayed the case while
HHS reviewed its research guidelines. 216 Once Bush announced his
stem cell policy, the plaintiff dismissed the case.217 The resolution of
the complaint might suggest that democratic accountability works, but
while politics cures some complaints, it also creates new grievances.
Whose accountability matters?
Even parties who do possess the wherewithal to challenge
regulatory decisions may bump up against justiciability barriers that
particularly affect public law litigation, such as sovereign immunity,
standing, the political question doctrine, ripeness, finality, and
exhaustion. 218 Take the standing doctrine, for example.219 Many
agency decisions in the areas of health, the environment, and public
welfare affect the entire population. Climate change is a paradigmatic
example. Yet the Supreme Court has held that it will not "entertain
citizen suits to vindicate the public's nonconcrete [sic] interest in the
proper administration of the laws.,,22o Instead, a plaintiff needs to
allege a specific, concrete, and personal injury not shared by the
entire public, and further show that the injury is caused by the
government action and is redressable by a favorable court decision. 22I
The plaintiffs in Massachusetts v. EPA surmounted this hurdle due to
the participation of Massachusetts. 222 As a sovereign, rather than a
private individual, Massachusetts had a "special position and interest"
in protecting its coastal land from rising waters caused by global

214. See Heled, supra note 56, at 124.
215. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Nightlight Christian v.
Thompson, No. 1.01-CV-00502 (D.D.C. dismissed Jan. 15,2002).
216. Id.
217. Christian Legal Society, Victory Achieved in Nightlight Christian Adoptions v.
Tommy G. Thompson, Oct. 27, 2003, http://www.clsnet.org/clrfPages/litigation/litigation_
Nightlight.php.
218. See generally PIERCE, ET AL., supra note 88, at 118--220.
219. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
220. Id. at 581 (Kennedy, 1., concurring).
221. See id. at 560-61 (majority opinion).
222. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1453-59 (2007).
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warming. 223 While the dissent bemoaned the relaxation of Article III
standing requirements for states,224 it seems that neither the majority
nor the dissent would have found standing in the absence of a state
plaintiff. 225 And, of course, states do not always have an independent
interest in or desire to challenge federal agency action.
In addition, agencies are now on notice that they need to provide
reasoned explanations for their decisions. 226 This does not mean,
however, that politics will not play a role in agency decisions.
Agencies may simply hide politics behind science. Moreover, given
agencies' scientific expertise relative to courts, courts are often
reluctant to second-guess the scientific determinations of agencies.
Deference to agency expertise seems appropriate, but it does open the
door for politics to get dressed up in the guise of science-which is
exactly how President Bush justified his policies on stem cells and
climate change. Right now, EPA cannot really argue with a straight
face that climate change science is uncertain, but less prominent
scientific issues might be more manipulable.
Finally, even if a party gets a court to reach the merits, this does
not mean that politics will be vanquished. We need only look at
EPA's response to Massachusetts v. EPA to see that the Bush White
House continued to call the shots. After the case was decided, EPA
resisted taking the action demanded by the Supreme Court and the
mandate of the Clean Air Act remained unfulfilled during the Bush
Administration. 227

B. Congress
Congress did not act as a significant check on the Bush
Administration's politicization of science, although Democratic
members of Congress investigated and aired the issue.228 In 2007,
Representative Henry Waxman (D-Cal.), as Chair of the House

223. Id. at 1454.
224. Id. at 1464 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
225. The rationale for the Court's standing holding remains ambiguous. See Bradford
Mank, Should States Have Greater Standing Rights Than Ordinary Citizens? Massachusetts
v. EPA's New Standing Testfor States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1701, 1704 (200S) ("The
Court ... failed to explain to what extent or when states are entitled to more lenient standing").
226. 127 S. Ct. at 1463 (majority opinion) (requiring that EPA make a "reasoned
judgment" about "whether greenhouse gases contribute to global warming").
227. See supra notes 4S-55 and accompanying text.
22S. See Richard Simon, Waxman Prods White House for Climate Documents, WASH.
POST, Jan. 31, 2007, at A19 (describing hearings).
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Oversight and Government Reform Committee, spearheaded a
congressional investigation into allegations that the Bush
Administration interfered in climate change science.229 The
Committee held public hearings, conducted witness interviews and
depositions, subpoenaed agency documents, and ultimately released a
report accusing the Administration of engaging "in a systematic effort
to manipulate climate change science and mislead ~olicymakers and
the public about the dangers of global warming.,,2 0 Previously, in
2003, when the Republicans controlled the House, Waxman requested
that the minority staff of the Committee look into the treatment of
science and scientists across the federal bureaucracy.231 That report
similarly concluded, "The Administration's political interference with
science has led to misleading statements by the President, inaccurate
responses to Congress, altered web sites, suppressed agency reports,
erroneous international communications, and the gagging of
scientists.,,232
Following each report, the White House and
Republican committee members dismissed the charges as partisan
politicking. 233
Despite Representative Waxman's tackling of this issue,
Congress as an institution did not take firm action against the alleged
scientific shenanigans,234 just as it did not rein in the aggrandizement
of executive power related to the War on Terror. 235 Indeed, one of the
229. See Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform, U.S. House of Reps., Committee
Examines Political Interference with Climate Science, Mar. 19, 2007, http://oversight.house.
gov/story.asp?ID=1214.
230. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOy'T REFORM, U.S. HOUSE OF REps., POLITICAL
INTERFERENCE WITH CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE UNDER THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION i (Dec.
2007), available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/2007121 0 101633 .pdf.
231. SPECIAL INYESTIGA TION DIY., COMM. ON GOy'T REFORM-MINORITY STAFF, U.S.
HOUSE OF REpS., POLITICS AND SCIENCE IN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION, i (Aug. 2003,
updated Nov. 13, 2003), available at http://oversight.house.gov/features/politics_and_science/
pdfs/pdCpolitics_and_science_rep.pdf.
232. Id.
233. See Democrats' Report Hits Bush on Climate Policy, WASH. POST, Dec. 11,2007,
at A04 (Republicans call report a "partisan diatribe").
234. See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Data Gaps in Natural Resources Management: Sniffing
for Leaks Along the Information Pipeline, 83 IND. L.J. 407, 437 (2008) (discussing
congressional attempts to improve dissemination of national resources silence).
235. See Katyal, supra note 150, at 2316 ("[L]egislative abdication is the reigning
modus operandi. It is often remarked that '9/11 changed everything'; particularly so in the war
on terror, in which Congress has been absent or content to pass vague, open-ended statutes.");
Marc C. Rahdert, Double-Checking Executive Emergency Power: Lessons from Hamdi and
Hamdan, TEMP. L. REY. 451,456 (2007) ("So far in the war on terror, Congress has shown a
disinclination to assume an active limiting role").
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Administration's defenses of its climate change policy was that
Congress should be legislating on climate change rather than leaving
it to the executive branch. 236 There is Supreme Court precedent for
such an argument, arising in cases in which the Court has essentially
adopted a non-delegation doctrine for hot button issues of the day.237
Thus, the Supreme Court has struck down executive branch attempts
to regulate assisted suicide and to ban tobacco without clear direction
from Congress.238
Thus, a charitable reading of the Administration's failure to
regulate on climate change is that it is Congress's job to do so. The
counter-argument-as set forth by the Supreme Court-is that
Congress already did its job when it enacted the Clean Air Act.
Regardless, if the Administration truly felt it lacked power to regulate
greenhouse gases, it would not have been necessary for executive
officials to edit and distort climate change science. The pattern of
interference suggests that the Administration hoped to forestall
mandatory emission reductions by sowing confusion over the issue
and limiting the influence of environmental groups. At the same
time, Congress's lack of express action over climate change left the
door open for the White House to seize control of the issue.
With regard to stem cell research, Congress tried to pass various
stem cell related bills; most would have reversed President Bush's
policies,239 while other bills would have restricted stem cell research
further. 24o For instance, in 2006 and 2007, Congress passed the Stem
Cell Research Enhancement Act, which would have permitted stem
cell research on human embryos donated from in vitro fertility clinics
with the consent of the donors "regardless of the date on which the

236. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1460 (2007) (EPA argued that Congress
did not intend EPA to regulate greenhouse gases).
237. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000)
("[W]e are confident that Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision of such
economic and political significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion."); Gonzales v.
Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 246 (2006) ("The idea that Congress gave the Attorney General such
broad and unusual authority through an implicit delegation in the CSA's registration provision
is not sustainable").
238. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 161 (holding that the FDA cannot
assume authority to regulate tobacco); Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 265 (holding that the Attorney
General does not have authority to regulate assisted suicide).
239. See the bills cited in Heled, supra note 56, at 86 n.12!.
240. See Janet L. Dolgin, Surrounding Embryos. Biology. Ideology. and Politics, 16
HEALTH MATRIX 27, 53-54 (2006) (describing competing bills).
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stem cells were derived.,,24I President Bush vetoed these bills242 and
Congress could not muster the two-thirds majority needed to override
the vetoes. 243
As this demonstrates, it is not easy for Congress to check
specific exercises of presidential power because the transaction costs
are so high.244 Moreover, gathering a super-majority that can override
a presidential veto is difficult, because a small group of presidential
loyalists can usually ensure defeat. Thus, it is generally easier for
Congress to check executive power via its informal control over
administrative agencies than through lawmaking?45 Congress creates
agencies, designs them, sets their funding, and the Senate confirms
political appointees. 246 Congress also conducts oversight through
information requests, reporting requirements, informal contacts with
agency officials, hearings, and investigations.247
Of course, Congress competes with the President to control
agencies. In his arsenal, the President can command the public's
attention, review agency agendas, set budgetary priorities, and
appoint and remove agency heads with the resultant loyalty of
officials throughout the bureaucracy. 248 Particularly if the President is
directing agency outcomes, he can diminish the impact of
congressional oversight because the threat of removal can be more
powerful than that of the purse. Indeed, Congress's power of the
purse may be overstated in certain circumstances. If the government
is under-regulating, taking money away from an agency only

241. Heled, supra note 56, at 87 n.126 ("Despite the fact that the frrst session of the
109th Congress was clearly Republican, the Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act of 2005
passed by a majority of238-194 in the House of Representatives, and 63-37 in the Senate").
242. Press Release, White House, Message to the House of Representatives, 2006 WL
2007324 (July 19, 2006); Press Release, White House, President Bush Discusses Stem Cell
Veto and Executive Order, 2007 WLNR 11640195 (June 20, 2007).
243. See Jordan Saltzberg, The Current Embryonic Stem Cell Research Federal Funding
Policy: Undue Respect to Minority Ethical Considerations?, 29 1. LEGAL MED. 505, 510
(2008) (describing proposed legislation and presidential vetoes).
244. Political scientists Terry Moe and William Howell explain why Congress,
constituted by hundreds of members each beholden to different bounded constituencies, faces
immense transaction costs to overturn presidential action. Terry M. Moe & William G.
Howell, The Presidential Power o/Unilateral Action, 15 1.L. ECON. & ORG. 132, 133 (1999).
245. See Kagan, supra note 136, at 2256-60 (describing various models of congressional
control over agencies).
246. See Jack Beerman, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 61, 6971 (2006).

247. ld.
248. See PIERCE ET AL., supra note 88, at 81.

602

WILLAMETTE LAW REVIEW

[45:565

compounds the problem-Congress has to cut off its nose to spite its
face. Given these competing tensions, it is not surprising that the
politicization of science captured the attention of Democratic
congresspersons, but did not produce significant legislative pushback.
C. States

The most effective check on the Scientist-in-Chief did not come
through the separation of powers, but through federalism. Several
states rejected the scientific conclusions of the Bush Administration
and countered with their own, generally more progressive, policies. 249
States developed their own stem cell policies, limited greenhouse gas
emissions, and sued the federal government over its climate change
policies. 25o In addition, many states were "developing renewable
energy portfolio standards; working to restore and better manage
major watersheds and water resources . . . and enacting merc~
emissions standards more stringent than current federal levels.,,2 I
This state-level activity, taken by states both individually and in
regional coalitions, stirred up a long-standing debate as to which level
of government is in the best position to regulate public health and the
environment. 252
On the one hand, federal level policymaking is more uniform
and creates efficiencies because regulated parties do not have to
accommodate a fifty state patchwork of policies.253 Moreover, the
federal government has greater financial resources and expertise, and
certain nationwide problems simply cannot be solved by smaller subunits of government. 254 On the other hand, proponents of state-level
action assert that states are filling a federal vacuum, are closer to the

249. See e.g., Kaswan, supra note 35, at 46-60 (describing state and local global
warming initiatives).
250. See infra text accompanying notes 263-73.
251. See Darren Springer, How States Can Help to Resolve the Rapanos/Carabell
Dilemma, TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 83, 83-84 (2007).
252. The seminal article is Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of
Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE
L.J. 1196 (1977) (arguing in favor of federal responsibility for environmental regulation), and
the leading response is Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking
the Race-to-the-Bottom Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1210 (J 992) (arguing that the race-to-the-bottom theory is incorrect).
253. See Robert B. McKinstry, Jr. & Thomas D. Peterson, The Implications of the New
"Old" Federalism in Climate-Change Legislation: How to Function in a Global Marketplace
When States Take the Lead, 20 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 61 (2007).
254. See Kaswan, supra note 35, at 64.
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cItIzens they serve, operate more efficiently because they tailor
solutions to regional specifics, and serve as laboratories for policy
experimentation that can spur federal action.255 This federalism debate
generally does not capture an additional attribute of state level
policymaking-for better or worse, states can serve as a check on
presidential exercises of directory authority. For political and judicial
conservatives, who generally favor a unitary executive as well as
states' rights, this new trend raises an interesting conflict.
In the area of stem cell research, California and New Jersey
responded to President Bush's policy by enacting laws in 2004
permitting stem cell research that is currently forbidden with federal
funds. 256 Californians even passed a voter referendum allocating $3
billion in state funds for cell research over the next ten years.257 The
statutes in both states stress the economic and medical benefits
generated by support for biomedical research. 258 Other states,
including Illinois, Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, New York,
Indiana and Maryland, have also authorized state funding for stem
cell research.259
States have been even more pro-active on the issue of global
warming in the face of perceived federal intransigence, with
California as the leader. In July 2002, California passed a statute
requiring auto makers to reduce vehicular emissions from all cars sold
in the state. 260 Twelve states subsequently adopted California's
standards, but in December 2007, after much delay, EPA denied
California the waiver needed to implement its laws, contending that
national standards were needed and that the state laws were

255. See McKinstry & Peterson, supra note 253, at 87-89.
256. See, e.g., N.J. Rev. Stat. § 26:2Z-1 (2004) (New Jersey); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 125300 (2004) (California).
257. California Stem Cell Research and Cures Act, 2004 Cal. Legis. Servo Prop. 71
(West). In November 2007, New Jersey voters rejected a measure that would have permitted
the state to borrow $450 million for stem cell research. See David W. Chen, New Jersey
Voters Defeat Stem Cell Measure, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7,2007, at BI.
258. See N.J. Rev. Stat. § 26:2Z-1 (2004) (New Jersey); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 125300 (2004) (California).
259. Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, Stem Cell Research, http://www.ncsl.org!
programs/healthlGenetics/embfet.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2009); Jodi Rudoren, Stem Cell
Work Gets States' Aid After Bush Veto, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2006, at AI, A16. At the same
time, a few states have enacted laws more stringent than Bush's policy, outlawing any forms
ofresearch on embryonic stem cells, regardless of when the lines were derived.
260. See Kaswan, supra note 35, at 48.
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preempted by federal efforts?61 Thus, none of the states could move
forward with these automobile emission standards.
Nevertheless, states have been working to reduce emissions in
other economic sectors. By mid-2007, seventeen states had
implemented targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 262 For
instance, California Governor Schwarzenegger issued an executive
order that orders a reduction in the state's greenhouse gas emissions
to 80% below 1990 levels by 2050. 263 The California legislature
passed the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, which would
reduce emissions to 1990 levels by 2020 via direct controls over
energy producers, market measures, and incentive systems. 264 The
state legislators were persuaded that these tougher controls would
"increase state revenues by four billion dollars and bring eighty
thousand new jobs" to the state. 265 Similarly, there are three regional
coalitions in which states have banded together and committed to
regional emission caps.266 These state-level initiatives face possible
preemption and dormant commerce clauses challenges,267 but
regardless, they have helped to eliminate "scientific uncertainty" from
public discourse. Finally, several states turned to the federal judicial
branch and sued EPA over its failure to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions in the lawsuit that culminated in Massachusetts v. EPA.
Thus, states have used both their executive and legislative powers, as
well as the federal judiciary, to resist Bush Administration policies.

D. Media
As the footnotes to this Article amply demonstrate, the media
took an active interest in the Bush Administration's politicization of
science. Major newspapers printed exposes and authors wrote
lengthy books about the subject. At the same time, politicians and

261. See Maynard, supra note 53.
262. See Kevin L. Doran, u.s. Sub-Federal Climate Change Initiatives: An Irrational
Means to a Rational End?, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189, 209 (2008) (noting that states have acted
via several methods, including executive orders, legislation, and press releases).
263. See Kaswan, supra note 35, at 53.
264. See id. at 55, 58. The states are also suing various industries under a nuisance
theory. /d. at 91-93.
265. See Dale Bryk, States Tackle Global Warming, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'y
53, 53 (2007).
266. See Kaswan, supra note 35, at 58.
267. See McKinstry & Peterson, supra note 253, at 92-109 (analyzing challenges to state
authority to limit greenhouse gas emissions).
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scientists used media outlets to air their attacks and counter-attacks.
Part of the unfolding story was the Bush Administration's attempts to
prevent certain scientific findings from reaching the media.
Media coverage had some impact. Administration officials, such
as Philip Cooney, resigned after the media spotlighted their
incompetence and meddling. 268
Media reports spurred some
government agencies to conduct internal investigations that generated
new policies to protect agency scientists and promote transparency?69
Thus, the media clearly enhanced accountability by reporting on the
politicization of science.
At the same time, the media's ability to enforce accountability is
limited because it needs to rely heavily on sources working within the
federal government. Several whistleblowers reported alleged
Administration abuses and others quit their positions to make a public
statement of their dissatisfaction. 270 However, this also means that if
people are reluctant to come forward, we may never hear their stories.
Many instances of White House involvement in agency decisionmaking are conducted out of public sight?71 An in-depth study of
White House control over EPA showed that 97% of White House
involvement over agency decisions was not visible or only somewhat
visible to the pUblic.272 Moreover, despite the flow of stories
reporting White House meddling, interference, censorship, and
distortion in agency decision-making, the Administration's policies
on climate change and stem cells remained the same. Thus, while the
media can present the story to the public, it remains up to other
governmental branches and the public to do something about it.
During the Bush Administration, the states have took the lead.
CONCLUSION

Critics of President Bush allege that his Administration regularly
distorted and suppressed science. The politicization of science raises
not only the issue of dishonesty, but also whether the President can
268. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
269. See Andrew C. Revkin, NASA Office Is Criticized on Climate Reports, N.Y. TIMES,
June 3, 2008.
270. See, e.g., newspaper articles cited supra in notes 6 and II.
27\. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 174, at 1176 (the White House involvement in
science "has been conducted through backdoor (therefore hard to detect) influences on more
fonnal decisionmaking processes."); Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 178, at 92 ("White
House involvement should be more transparent").
272. See Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 178, at 78.
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substitute his choices for those of agency policymakers, thereby
acting as a Scientist-in-Chief. A President who distorts science can
make bad policy, demoralize government scientists, impede scientific
progress, and misinform the public about policy issues. In tum, this
undermines the democratic process because citizens debate issues and
cast votes based on faulty information. However, even if the
President was honest about science, and even if he got the science
right, we may still prefer that agencies make the policy decisions
entrusted to them by Congress. Agencies are experts in the areas they
regulate, they allow public participation and input, and they are
subject to checks by all three branches of government. The primary
justifications for unilateral presidential control of agencies are
efficiency and accountability. However, efficiency is not always
conducive to good policymaking, which requires deliberation,
accuracy, and fairness. Moreover, presidential elections are poor
guarantors of accountability, especially on complex scientific issues.
It is hard to build a case for a Scientist-in-Chief. And it is even harder
to restrain one.

